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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD WASHINGTON

September 6, 1951

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL W. BEDELL SMITH, DIRECTOR, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MR. JAMES E. WEBB, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE 25X PARENT LOVETT, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Plan

25X1A2G

- 1. Attached is a copy of plan an emergency plan designed to establish coordinated psychological courses of action to be pursued in preparation for and in the event of a permanent breakoff of Korean armistice negotiations.
- 2. This plan was presented at a meeting of the alternates for members of the Psychological Strategy Board. Subsequently, the alternates were further briefed on the content of the plan and most of their comments have been included in the present revision.

Alternates were:

Mr. John Ferguson for Mr. James E. Webb

Brigadier General John Magruder for Mr. Robert Lovett

Mr. Allen Dulles for General W. Bedell Smith

3. It is requested that Board members give approval to the plan or indicate further modification desired.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

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CHARLES W. McCARTHY Colonel, USA Executive Officer Approved For Release 2002/01/03 : CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010121-9

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGY BOARD

EMERGENCY PLAN

BREAK-OFF OF KOREAN ARMISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

6 SEPTEMBER 1951

T-O-P S-E-C-R-E-T

TOP SECRET

J-19-6

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PSYCHOLOGICAL STRANDOWA BOARD

EMERGENCY PLAN

BREAKOFF OF KOREAN ARTISTICE NEGOTIATIONS

I

INTRODUCTION

This plan endeavors to establish, for governmental departments and agencies engaged in psychological operations, courses of action for application in preparation for and in the event of a breakdown in the Korean armistice negotiations.

II

PROBLEM

To develop psychological courses of action to be pursued in preparation for and in the event of breakoff of Korean armistice negotiations.

III

SITUATION

- 1. Should the present Korean armistice talks fail, the danger of general war will be increased.
- 2. A period of slarm and spiritual depression will accompany the breakoff of negotiations and during this period the peoples of the world will be psychologically vulnerable.
- 3. It is imperative that we stand ready to wrest from Communism, during this period of psychological vulnerability, the initiative in psychological matters.

IV

PRECEPTS FOR PLANNING

1. On the principle that sound psychological operations are not independent operations but operations in support of political, economic, and military action,

and with the purpose of achieving U. S. initiative in the current psychological struggle with the Soviet Union, the following planning precepts are established:

- a. The policies, attitudes, and actions of the United Nations (as they reflect those of the United States) with respect to the initiation, conduct, and termination of the negotiations shall be put forcefully before the world;
- b. Communist propaganda and agitation with respect to the issues involved shall be vigorously undercut;
- c. Psychological planning shall be directed toward the end of achieving marked intensification of anti-Communist attitudes, actions, and capabilities of the free world:
- d. Psychological action shall be thoroughly integrated with United Nations political, economic, and military policy (as it reflects United States political, economic, and military policy).

V

ASSUMPTIONS

- 1. That the United States continues to act within the framework of UN authorization and seeks constantly to maintain and strenguise UN support for U.S. political, economic, and military policies and actions following weekoff of negotiations.
- 2. That, as sequel to breakdown of negotiations, military operations in Korea, entering into a new phase, may take on greater scope.

VI

CONTINGENCIES TO BE CONSIDERED

- 1. In approaching the problem, three possible contingencies must be considered:

 CONTINGENCY I
 - a. There is a definitive end to negotiations;
 - b. The Communists launch a mass offensive against UN forces including massive air attacks or submarine action against UN ground, air or

neval forces.

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CONTINGENCY II

- a. There is a definite end to negotiations;
- b. The Communists launch a massive ground offensive against UN forces;
- c. The enemy does <u>not</u> initiate massive air attacks or submarine action against UN ground or naval forces and his counteraction to UN air attacks is not sufficiently strong to interfere seriously with the effectiveness of UN operations.

CONTINGENCY III

- a. Negotiations fade out or adjourn without a clear break and with possibility existing for renewal at any time;
- b. Communists do not launch massive air attacks or submarine action;
- c. No evidence of increased major enemy ground or air build-up in Korea or Manchuria. (In other words, evemy appears to be attempting to bring about a situation of defacto ceasefire without agreement.)
- 2. Possible modifications of the above contingencies are foreseeable, but proper planning for the listed contingencies will encompass those modifications should they arise.

VII

DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM

A. PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

- 1. Essential to the task of U. S. psychological operations is the seizure from the Kremlin of the psychological initiative. To accomplish such seizure we must not only anticipate events having psychological import but must also have a properly formulated psychological attack underway prior to the event.
- 2. Our hold on the initiative once gained must then be constantly strengthened by the manner in which it is exploited. The psychological attack must have well-defined objectives, must be of sufficient scope to embrace all foreseeable occurrences, and must be so designed as to allow ample room for maneuver under any expected circumstance or set of circumstances.

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- The psychological attack not only must outguess all possible courses of action by the enemy, in order that these courses of action can be immediately countered, but also must create situations which will allow the enemy no choice but to move into psychologically disadvantageous positions.
- In addition, in the case of the Korean armistice negotiations the psychological attack must be governed by certain special considerations. Constantly it must be borno in mind that any action taken prior to an actual breakdown must not jeopardize, and preferably should enhance, the possibility of achieving our real, immediate objectives, which, in the case of Korean armistice negotiations, are specifically:
 - (1) To further the early and favorable completion of the negotiations
 - (2) To ensure that the United Nations and the United States are credited before the world for the successes obtained at the negotiations, and that the Soviet Union is blamed for all delays, obstacles, and failures.
- In addition, any psychological action relevant to anticipated breakdown of armistice negotiations should be such as to assist in the principal U.S. international objective of building the moral, economic, and military strength of the free world and the attaining and holding of political unity among the nations not now under the domination of Soviet Communism.


В. INITIATING THE ATTACK AND SETTING ITS SCOPE

On 4 September 1951 the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference meets in San Francisco. It is expected, and in fact the Soviet press has so stated, that the Soviet delegation will put forward "proposals". Beyond doubt these proposals will be designed to split the free nations. The natural trend for our propaganda to follow will be an increase in intensity of charges of Soviet (and Soviet-led Communist) insincerity, duplicity, intransigeance, and aggressive intent. Such a trend fits admirably into the principal purpose of this plan which is to wrest from Communism the psychological initiative. It is only natural also to draw parallels between Soviet obstructive tactics at the Peace Treaty Conference and similar Communist tactics in the Korean situation in general and the Korean armis—Approved For Release 2002/01/03: CIA-RDP80-01065A000400010121-9

tice negotiations in particular. This, also, admirably fits our purpose.

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2. Looking beyond the possibility of an armistice agreement at Kaescag to political negotiations regarding Korea, we see in this specific case the advantages that might accrue from greater room for maneuver in such political negotiations. Using graphical exposition this point might be explained as follows:



Within the purview of this plan the word "intensity" in its selation to propaganda shall be taken to mean: (a) percentage of output devoted to Korean events and issues; and (b) degree to which all U. S. propaganda is focused upon the Korean situation, principally by cross-relation of Korean lines with other cutput.

- 3. By maintaining, with forethought, the intensity of our psychological attack at the level it reaches at the Treaty Conference until Korean negotiations enter a political phase, rather than allowing it to drop back to pre-Conference level, we would achieve several advantages:
 - (1) Psychological activity would tend to prevent relaxation of free world distrust of Soviet-led Communism.
 - (2) Psychological activity would tend to prevent relaxation of rearmament efforts in the U.S. and the free world.
 - (3) We would have greater scope for maneuver, and the effect should be more marked, should conditions surrounding the Korean political negotiations dictate a slackening of our propaganda intensity;

But most important

- (4) Our psychological attack would not only be aiming at a possible target, the Korean political negotiations, but also would be aiming at the actual immediate target of this problem the Korean armistice negotiations.
- 4. It is apparent from the graph above that termination of the Korean armistice talks, whether successful or unsuccessful, will fall schewhere between the Japan Peace Treaty Conference and Korean political negotiations. It is natural that a high level of psychological intensity would and should accompany unsuccessful breakoff of Korean armistice negotiations. In the event that an armistice actually occurs our problem merely shifts from negotiations in the purely military field to negotiations in the political field.
- 5. Thus a high intensity psychological attack initiated concurrently with the Japan Peace Treaty Conference would serve our purpose for the Korean armistice negotiations as well as for possible Korean political negotiations. Speaking in terms of the psychological attack, we would be moving in on events rather than being in the position of having been caught short by events no matter what the outcome of the present Kaeseng talks.

C. CREATING SITUATIONS OF ADVANTAGE

- 1. In the case of the Korean armistice negotiations, a situation can be created which will leave the enemy little, if any, opportunity to move out from under our psychological guns.
- 2. Should we build prior to termination of Korean armistice negotiations the expectancy of a breakoff of those negotiations as the natural result of Communist insincerity, duplicity, and intransigeance, it is probable that, in some form, we would have one of the three following situations to face:
 - (1) There would be a definitive end to the armistice negotiations.
 - (2) There would not be a definitive end to armistice negotiations, but negotiations would fade out without a clear break and with the possibility open for renewal at any time.
 - (3) The armistice negotiations would be terminated successfully with political negotiations to follow.
- 3. Should the first situation above occur, it would be proof of inhumanity on the part of the Communist leaders, and of U. S. charges of insincerity,
 duplicity, intransigeance and aggressive intent on the part of Soviet-led Communism. Before the world the Soviet Union would be credited with failure of the
 armistice negotiations, political unity among nations opposing Soviet-led Communism would be strengthened, and the free world impetus toward the building of
 moral, economic, and military strength in the face of the Soviet-Communist menace
 would increase.
- 4. Should the second situation above develop, U. S. arguments would become stronger as the period without armistice lengthened. As in the case of the first situation, the insincerity, duplicity, intransigeance and aggressive intent of Soviet-led Communism would be cited in placing responsibility for failure to arrive at an armistice settlement. As in the preceding case, also, political unity of the free world would be strengthened and the urge toward moral, economic, and military rearmament would increase.

5. Should the third situation arrive, nothing would have been lost and much gained. Charges against Soviet-led Communism of insincerity, duplicity, intransigeance and aggressive intent would merely be shifted to the political negotiations which would follow the armistice. The special UN (U. S.) objective of achieving a Korean armistice would have been obtained. Success in the armistice negotiations would be attributed to UN confidence and determination and to the growing, and already considerable, moral, economic, and military strength of the free world. The fact of armistice could be taken as proof of the appropriatness and offectiveness of the U. S. psychological attack, and warnings of the Soviet double-cross to come in the political negotiations would prevent relevation in the anti-Communist attitudes, actions, and capabilities of the free world.

E. SEIZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INITIATIVE

Our first and principal objective, then, and the psychological courses of action supporting that objective, as extracted from the above discussion, can be summarized as follows:

To seizo from Soviet-led Communism the psychological initiative.

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COURSES OF ACTION UNDER THE OBJECTIVE

adituation. Psychological measures, therefor, to support all undertakings to maintain and increase free world military strength, will be necessary.

- 6. Finally, resumption at former scale and perhaps extension of the Korean military operations will undoubtedly come with unsuccessful termination of the Kassong armistice negotiations. Whatever form the Korean military operations may take, they must be supported by vigorous psychological warfare operations, not only in Korea but also, as the situation dictates, in contiguous areas.
- 7. National psychological objectives to be pursued in exploiting a break-down of Korean armistice negotiations develop naturally from the above discussion, and can be listed as follows:
 - 1. To fix moral and political responsibility for what has happened in Korea -- and all bad that will result therefrom -- upon Moscow, with specific responsibility being placed upon Moscow's Chinese and North Morean Communist collaborators.

(Note -- The relative emphasis of blame will of course be varied by area)

- 2. To establish complete justification for UN (ipso facto U. S.) partion on issue or issues over which breakdown takes place, and to destroy any semblance of justification for the Communist opposing position.
- 3. To justify, and gain worldwing support for, UN (ipso facto U. S.) political, economic, and military measures resultant from breakoff of Korean armistice negotiations.
- 4. To use the Korean incident to generate support for all undertakings to maintain and increase military strength in the U. S. and in the free world.
- 5. To assist, in Korea and contiguous areas, UN military operations.

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IX

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS RECOMMENDED

The following psychological courses of action pertinent to a breakdown in Korean armistice negotiations are recommended:

COURSE OF ACTION I

Departments, agencies, and officials presently charged with planning for and execution of actions listed in Section VIII of this plan continue planning for these actions, and execute approved plans in the event of breakdown of armistice negotiations.

COURSE OF ACTION II

Department of State, supported by other departments and agencies engaging in propaganda activities, develop and promulgate propaganda policy guidance in accordance with Section VII and ANNIENES (B), (C), (D), (E) and (F) of this plane

COURSE OF ACTION III

All overt propaganda agencies develop and disseminate propaganda in accordance with Department of State guidances.

COURSE OF ACTION IV

Covert propaganda agencies develop and disseminate propaganda designed to assist in achieving the psychological objectives contained in ANNEXES (B) through (G) of this plan.

ADDITICUAL COURSES OF ACTION

Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, supported by other departments and agencies as necessary, carry out planning, preparation, execution and development recommended in ANNEX (G).

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PLANMING, GOO'DENATION AND EXECUTION 25X1A2G

- a. Flanning and execution under Basic Flanding will be as indicated in assigned courses of action.
- b. The department or agency having primary planning and execution responsibility for portions of this plan will coordinate planning and execution with departments and agencies which are assigned or accept supporting responsibilities.
- c. In instances in which necessary concurrences between departments and agencies are not forthcoming, planning and execution problems will be referred to the Psychological Strategy Board for necessary coordination or procurement of higher level decision.

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- d. Departments and agencies to whom Flat serious signs planning and execution responsibilities will submit special reports, as requested, to the raychological Strategy Board.

Attention

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- prepared by the Foreign Information Folicy Staff, Demethent of State, will apply
 in the event a breakoff of regotiations occurs prior to completion of special
 plans developed under these objectives.

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- f. Special Contingency Guidance of 27 July 1952, prepared by the Foreign Information Policy Staff, Department of State, will apply in similar direcumstances, if the UN Command is compelled by a Communist air offensive to launch air attacks on Chinese and Manchurian bases.